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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION-ANTITRUST-THE IMPACT OF THE
BRITISH PROTECTION OF TRADING INTERESTS ACT ON THE UNITED
STATES ANTITRUST SUIT BROUGHT BY LAKER AIRWAYS AGAINST BRIT-
ISH AIRWAYS AND BRITISH CALEDONIAN.
On November 24, 1982 the liquidators of the recently bankrupt
British carrier, Laker Airways, Ltd. (Laker),' filed a $1.7 billion
civil antitrust suit in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.2 The suit alleged that British Airways, British
Caledonian Airways, Ltd., and six non-British international air-
lines' had conspired to force Laker out of business through preda-
Laker Airways, Ltd., founded in Britain by Sir Freddie Laker in 1966, was based on the
concept of low cost scheduled transatlantic flights. In 1971 Laker expanded the service to
include the operation of a "Skytrain" service between London and New York. The "Sky-
train" featured first come, first serve ticket sales and a basic economy class flight. Accord-
ingly, the ticket prices were lower than those for flights which included more luxurious ac-
commodations. In 1981 Laker began to suffer from financial difficulties which, compounded
by a devalued pound, made it impossible for the company to meet its large loan repayments.
Laker was forced to declare bankruptcy on February 5, 1982. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124, 1126-27 (D.D.C. 1983). See generally Freddie's
Creditors Join the Used Aircraft Business, 282 ECONOmisT 60 (Jan.-Mar. 1982).
' Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, No. 82-3362 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 24,
1982). Laker's suit alleged $350 million in actual damages; under provisions in the Clayton
Act, however, Laker could be awarded treble damages, court costs, attorneys' fees, and in-
terest totalling about $1.7 billion. British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1983] 3 All
E.R. 375, 400 (C.A.). See also Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Laker brought the suit
in the United States because the defendants' alleged activity had not violated any British
laws. Laker Airways, 559 F. Supp. at 1136-37. See infra note 30. The District Court for the
District of Columbia accepted jurisdiction because the Sherman Act gives federal courts
jurisdiction in antitrust cases and because the activity was alleged to have taken place in the
United States. See Laker Antitrust Suit Against Major Airlines Will be Tried in U.S.
Court, 44 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1114, at 982 (May 12, 1982). See also
Sherman Act §§ 1-2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976). In personam jurisdiction over the defendants
was based on their contact with the United States as international carriers. Laker Antitrust
Suit Against Major Airlines will be Tried in U.S. Court, supra, at 982.
' The other defendants were: Pan American World Airways, Inc., Trans World Airlines,
Inc., Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., Sabena Belgian
World Airlines, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, McDonnell Douglas Corp., and McDonnell
Douglas Finance Corp. Laker Airways, 559 F. Supp. at 1126.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. and its finance company, McDonnell Douglas Finance Corp.,
were named as defendants because Laker alleged that the defendant airlines pressured Mc-
Donnell Douglas, General Electric, and a number of banks into denying Laker the refinanc-
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tory pricing agreements. 4 The two British defendants responded in
January 1983 by filing for declaratory judgments and injunctions
in the British High Court of Justice.5 The High Court initially
granted a preliminary injunction against Laker, barring further
prosecution of its district court action.' After a full hearing, how-
ever, the High Court denied the airlines' requests for declaratory
or injunctive relief, thus allowing Laker to proceed in the United
States district court.7
Laker's counsel made extensive requests for corporate docu-
ments located in Britain during pretrial discovery, but the British
defendants refused to comply until an appeal of the High Court
ruling was heard by the British Court of Appeal.8 Meanwhile, the
British Government intervened on June 24, 1983 by invoking the
Protection of Trading Interests Act (PTIA)9 and officially barred
ing it needed. McDonnell Douglas and General Electric had seemed willing to agree to re-
duce the debt which Laker owed them in exchange for part ownership of Laker. At the last
minute, this offer was withdrawn, and Laker went into bankruptcy. Sunday Times
(London), June 26, 1983, at C60, col. 8.
' Laker alleged that the defendant airlines had agreed to set their fares at a loss-produc-
ing level in order to force Laker out of business. Court Bars Six Airlines Sued by Laker
from Seeking Relief from Foreign Forums, 44 ANTrrusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No.
1106, at 606 (Mar. 17, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Court Bars Six]. In late March 1983, the
Antitrust Division of the United States Justice Department began a grand jury investigation
into possible criminal violations by the defendants in the Laker suit. American-British
Route is Focus of Criminal Probe, 44 ANTrriusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1106, at 695
(Mar. 31, 1983).
' British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1983] 3 All E.R. 375 (Q.B.). British Airways
requested a declaration of non-liability by the court, stating that Laker could not join it as a
defendant. Both British Airways and British Caledonian requested permanent injunctions
barring Laker from continuing its action in the United States district court. Id. at 380. See
also Court Bars Six, supra note 4, at 606.
British Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R. at 380 (Q.B.).
Id. at 394-95. The court held that the defendant airlines could not depend on the inter-
national aviation treaty for a defense. Id. See Air Transport Services Treaty, July 23, 1977,
United States-United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, 28 U.S.T. 5367, T.I.A.S. No. 8641
[hereinafter cited as Bermuda Two Treaty]. The Treaty governs international airline service
by providing mechanisms for pricing agreements and arbitration of disputes. See infra notes
65-68 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the court held that Laker should be allowed to
continue litigation in the United States because an injunction would deny it the forum for
its claim, yet the situation could change drastically if the British Government invoked the
Protection of Trading Interests Act. British Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R. at 395 (Q.B.).
' Laker's requests were filed in accordance with rules 33 and 34 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1983] 3 All E.R. 375, 400
(C.A.).
' An Act to provide protection from requirements, prohibitions and judgments imposed
or given under the law of countries outside the United Kingdom and affecting the trading or
other interests of persons in the United Kingdom (Protection of Trading Interests Act
1980), 1980, ch. 11, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 834 (1982) [hereinafter cited as PTIA].
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the two British airlines from producing any documents located in
the United Kingdom which could be used in the United States liti-
gation.10 Relying upon the PTIA orders as additional grounds for
reinstating the injunction against Laker's prosecution, the defen-
dant British airlines argued their case before the Court of Appeal.
Held, reversed, injunctive relief granted. In view of the government
orders barring production of documents under the PTIA, allowing
Laker to continue would constitute "a total denial of justice" to
the British defendants.11 Laker is therefore enjoined from continu-
ing its suit against the British defendants in the United States dis-
trict court. British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1983] 3
All E.R. 375 (C.A.).
Under the provisions of United States antitrust law, either pri-
vate parties or the Government may bring actions against a foreign
company based on allegations of agreements which restrict free
trade.12 Although early attempts to gain jurisdiction over foreign
10 See The Protection of Trading Interests (U.S. Antitrust Measures) Order 1983, [1983]
STAT. INST. No. 900. Under the power granted by sections 1 and 2 of the PTIA, the British
Secretary of State issued one "order" and two "directions" in relation to the Laker litiga-
tion. The texts of the order and of the directions are reprinted in the British Court of Ap-
peal's opinion. British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1983] 3 All E.R. at 404-07 (C.A.).
The order, dated June 23, 1983, states that sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and sec-
tions 4 and 4(a) of the Clayton Act do not apply to:
1. an agreement to which a United Kingdom airline was a party;
2. any discussion with a United Kingdom airline as a party; or
3. any act by a United Kingdom airline pursuant to the Bermuda Two Treaty.
Id. at 405.
The first direction, also dated June 23, 1983, prohibited the two British airlines from
complying with any of the antitrust regulations or prohibitions referred to in the above
order. Id. at 406. The second direction, dated July 1, 1983, was issued under sections 2(2)
and 2(3) of the PTIA and barred the two British airlines from complying with the United
States requests from both the district court and the grand jury to produce documents lo-
cated in Britain. Id. at 406-07. One source suggested that among the motivations for the
British Government's action was a concern over the impact of a substantial treble damage
judgment on the plans to "privatize" British Airways. Wall St. J., June 27, 1983, at 32, col.
1.
1* British Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R. at 410 (C.A.). The court also denied Laker's request
for judicial review of the British Secretary of State's orders under the PTIA. The court held
that he had not acted ultra vires and that he was well within the discretionary range
granted to him by the PTIA. Id. at 407.
See Sherman Act §§ 1-2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982); Clayton Act §§ 4-4(a), 15 U.S.C. §§
15-15(a)(1982). Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares that any combination in the restraint
of trade is a felony. Section 2 provides that any attempt to form a monopoly will be pun-
ished as a felony. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides for private actions on antitrust
claims with damages recoverable at threefold the actual damages suffered. Section 4(a) al-
lows the United States Government to bring a civil suit on antitrust claims, although treble
damages are not recoverable. See generally J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTTrrusT AND
AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (2d ed. 1981). Laker's action is under section 4 of the Clayton
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companies were frustrated because courts applied a "territorial"
concept of jurisdiction, 13 the introduction of the "effects doctrine"
in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa) resulted in
a broad extraterritorial expansion of jurisdiction." In Alcoa, a case
involving alleged price fixing agreements between British, French,
Swiss, and Canadian aluminum ingot producers, the court held
that United States courts had jurisdiction for antitrust litigation
over any business which had an intended effect on domestic trade
or commerce, including those businesses whose activities took
place entirely outside of the United States borders. 15
The "effects test" has remained the guideline for the majority of
Act, and the Justice Department's investigation is under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. British Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R. at 400-01 (C.A.).
" The Supreme Court held in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347
(1909), that provisions of the Sherman Act could not be applied to activity outside United
States territory. The case involved allegations that United Fruit Company had persuaded
the Costa Rican militia to force its competitors out of business. Id. at 354-55. In affirming
the lower court's decision, Justice Holmes wrote: "[T]he general and almost universal rule is
that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of
the country where the act is done." Id. at 356.
14 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Alcoa involved allegations of price fixing agreements
among foreign aluminum producers which, if they had been between domestic producers,
would have violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 444. The court extended jurisdiction to the
defendants on the ground that their activities were intended to have an "effect" on United
States imports. Id.
"Id. at 443-44. Judge Learned Hand said:
[I]t is settled law.., that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons
not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences
within its borders which the state reprehends .... Both agreements would
clearly have been unlawful had they been made within the United States; and it
follows from what we have just said that both were unlawful, though made abroad,
if they were intended to affect imports and did affect them.
Id. See generally Note, Shortening the Long Arm of American Antitrust Jurisdiction: Ex-
traterritoriality and the Foreign Blocking Statutes, 28 Loy. L. Rav. 213, 214-20 (1982) (dis-
cussion of progression from United Fruit through Alcoa); Jennings, Extraterritorial Juris-
diction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 Barr. Y.B. INT'L. L. 146 (1957)
(interesting treatment of Alcoa from the British perspective; same arguments against extra-
territorial jurisdiction used by British officials in British Airways).
The synthesis of the "effects test" is:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences
to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its terri-
tory, if either (a) the conduct and its effects are generally recognized as constitu-
ent elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably devel-
oped legal systems, or (b) (i) the conduct and its effects are constituent elements
of activity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substan-
tial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the
territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principle of justice gener-
ally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965).
1984] EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
the United States federal circuits. In the last five years, however,
some circuits have adopted a more elaborate "balancing test" to
determine whether jurisdiction should be extended extraterritori-
ally.' 6 These courts consider a number of factors, both foreign and
domestic, in determining whether the need for extending jurisdic-
tion outweighs the potential injury to a foreign nation's sovereignty
in each particular case.17 Without a Supreme Court ruling settling
16 A few courts have softened the impact of the Alcoa test by balancing effects against
principles of comity. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 1597 (9th Cir.
1976); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Montreal
Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981); International Ass'n of Machinists
v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981). But see In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617
F.2d 1248, 1255-56 (7th Cir. 1980) ("the Mannington Mills factors are not the law of this
circuit"); International Inv. Dev. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The
wide ranging inquiry suggested by Timberlane and its progeny does not fit within... [the
federal] approach to subject matter jurisdiction"). See generally Note, supra note 15, at
225.
1 Two primary cases, Timberlane and Mannington Mills, introduced basic principles of
international comity into jurisdiction questions through the development of the "balancing
test." Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613-15; Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98.
Timberlane involved an antitrust suit filed by a United States lumber company with sub-
sidiaries in Honduras claiming that the Bank of America and others were conspiring to keep
the Timberlane subsidiaries out of the Honduran lumber market. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at
601. In determining whether jurisdiction should be extended extraterritorially, the
Timberlane court considered three conditions:
1. the alleged act bad to affect or intend to affect American foreign commerce;
2. the effect had to result in a "cognizable injury" to the plaintiffs; and
3. the American interests must be strong enough that when viewed against the
foreign interests, the extension of jurisdiction is justified.
Id. at 613.
In Mannington Mills the dispute involved a claim by a United States floor coverings man-
ufacturer that the defendant had secured foreign patents by fraud which, if perpetrated in
securing a domestic patent, would lead to antitrust liability. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at
1290. The court held that because both parties were United States corporations and because
the defendant's action had an effect on United States commerce, the court had subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. The court maintained, however, that the exercise of that jurisdiction re-
quired consideration of the foreign nation's laws under which the defendant was operating.
Id. at 1291-99. The factors that the court believed should have been considered in determin-
ing the propriety of exercising jurisdiction were:
1. The degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that
abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its
foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and
grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being
forced to perform any act illegal in either country or be under conflicting require-
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the issue,"8 the circuit in which the action is brought is often deter-
minative of which test will be applied to determine whether juris-
diction should be extended extraterritorially.1'
For decades the British Government has resisted attempts by
United States courts to gain jurisdiction over British companies
named as defendants in antitrust actions.20 That resistance stems
from three fundamental disagreements between Britain and the
United States.21 First, United States extraterritorial jurisdiction
conflicts with the British view of jurisdiction.2 The British view
emphasizes the concepts of territorial and national jurisdiction in
order to preserve the nation's absolute control over persons and
activities within its territorial boundaries and over its nationals
wherever they may be.28 The British believe the extent to which
the effects test allows United States jurisdiction to reach commer-
cial activities inside Great Britain is an invasion of that sphere of
jurisdiction which is inherently British.2 ' Second, the treble dam-
ments by both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. When an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the
foreign nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
Id. at 1297-98. The "balancing test" therefore represents an attempt by some courts to in-
terject concepts of international comity and fairness into the extraterritorial jurisdiction
question. See Note, supra note 15, at 222. The American Law Institute has proposed that
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust enforcement be limited to those in-
stances where it is "not unreasonable" according to factors similar to those used in
Timberlane and Mannington Mills. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (REvISED) § 415(3) reporter's note 4 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
's Alcoa has, however, been cited with approval in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide
and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 (1962) (dictum).
19 One writer has suggested that some of the foreign dissatisfaction with United States
extraterritorial jurisdiction is based on the inconsistent approaches of the United States
courts. See Comment, Foreign Blocking Legislation: Recent Roadblocks to Effective En-
forcement of American Antitrust Law, [1981] Aiuz. ST. L.J. 945, 961-62.
20 For a thorough discussion of the history of the British afforts to block United States
extraterritorial jurisdiction, see Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 Am. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
" See Note, Section 6 of Great Britain's Protection of Trading Interests Act: The Claw
and the Lever, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 457, 463-64 (1981).
" See Diplomatic Note No. 196 (July 27, 1978), reprinted in 49 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 390
(1979) (note from British Embassy to United States Department of State outlining British
opposition to United States extraterritorial jurisdiction).
2' For an extensive treatment of the British theories of national and territorial jurisdic-
tion, see Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145 (1972).
" British Secretary of State Nott, in his remarks introducing the Protection of Trading
Interests Bill to Parliament, discussed the two views of jurisdiction and underscored the
British Government's opposition to interference in the sovereign zones defined by those the-
ories. See 973 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1534-37 (1979) (remarks of Secretary of State
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ages provisions of United States antitrust law are repugnant to
British theories of law enforcement.2 5 The United Kingdom con-
siders treble damage awards to be punitive and disagrees with en-
couraging international law enforcement by private persons
through the allure of substantial financial gain.26 British officials
insist that such law enforcement should be conducted only at the
sovereign level as a settlement of grievances between the govern-
ments of the two nations.17 United States officials, however, con-
tinue to assert that the private incentive produces more thorough
enforcement. 28 Third, British and United States policies on restric-
tive trade practices do not coincide; Britain does not share the sus-
picion of concentrated economic power which is at the heart of
United States antitrust law." Rather, British companies are per-
mitted to exercise economic power without restraint unless they
clearly abuse that power. 80 Thus, the British Government views
the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law as an
Nott).
" United States law allows both civil and criminal antitrust actions, but British law limits
antitrust actions to civil suits. See Note, supra note 21, at 463-64. Since United States
courts allow recovery of treble damages, a punitive measure, the British Government be-
lieves that the United States is treating civil cases like criminal ones without the safeguards
of criminal procedure. Id.
He United Kingdom Response to the U.S. Diplomatic Note Concerning the U.K. Protec-
tion of Trading Interests Bill (Nov. 27, 1979), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 847 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as U.K. Response]. This Diplomatic Note stated that-
two basically undesirable consequences follow from the enforcement of public law
in this field by private remedies. First, the usual discretion of a public authority to
enforce laws in a way which has regard to the interests of society is replaced by a
motive on the part of the plaintiff to pursue defendants for private gain thus ex-
cluding international considerations of a public nature. Secondly, where criminal
and civil penalties co-exist, those engaged in international trade are exposed to
double jeopardy.
Id. at 849.
27 Id. at 847.
2' United States officials maintain that the use of "private attorneys-general" is crucial to
adequate deterrence of antitrust activity because of the limited resources available to gov-
ernmental agencies. See United States Diplomatic Note Concerning the U.K. Protection of
Trading Interests Bill (Nov. 9, 1979), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 840, 843 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as U.S. Note].
"The fundamental concern of the United States Government in international antitrust
enforcement is the protection of domestic companies from foreign collective restraints on
trade. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUsTIcE, ANTIrRuST Dn SION, ANTITRUST GumE FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977). See also Note, supra note 21, at 464.
" In Britain, restrictive agreements are not illegal per se as they are in the United States,
and economic power may be exercised without restraint unless there is evidence of abuse.
See Note, supra note 21, at 464. Commercial regulation in Britain focuses on monitoring the
activities of cooperative agreements and guarding against abuses directed against small
businesses. Id.
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attempt to export an unwelcome commercial policy. 1
Britain's first clear legislative attempt to reduce foreign interfer-
ence with British commercial practices was the Shipping Contracts
and Commercial Documents Act (SCDA), enacted in 1964."2 The
SCDA was passed in response to the growing conflict between the
United States and Great Britain over the regulation of British
shipping," and was designed to insulate the British shipping indus-
try from foreign interference. 4 However, several serious conflicts
which later arose between British companies and the United States
courts demonstrated that the SCDA could not protect a broad
range of British commercial activities.35 One such conflict occurred
in March 1970, when a British drug manufacturer was named as a
defendant in a collection of civil antitrust suits concerning an al-
leged conspiracy to restrain and monopolize trade in the drug
ampicillin.3s Attempts by the British Government to block the pro-
duction of documents by invoking the SCDA only resulted in a
" See U.K. Response, supra note 26, at 848-49; Lowe, supra note 20, at 259; 405 PARL.
DaB. H.L. (5th ser.) 569 (1980) (remarks of Lord Lloyd). Lord Lloyd said that "[ilt has
become increasingly intolerable to many British interests that other countries should so
often assert their laws outside their own territories so as to enforce their own economic and
commercial policies unilaterally in relation to international trade." Id.
'2 An Act to secure Her Majesty's jurisdiction against encroachment by certain foreign
requirements in respect of the carriage of goods or passengers by sea and in respect of the
production of documents and furnishing of information (The Shipping Contracts and Com-
mercial Documents Act, 1964), 1964, ch. 87 [hereinafter cited as SCDAI.
During the 1960's, British officials increasingly protested United States attempts to ex-
tend extraterritorially the jurisdiction of the United States Federal Maritime Commission to
regulate international shipping. See Lowe, supra note 20, at 260.
" The SCDA provides that the Minister of Transport could issue directions prohibiting
the compliance with any-
measures that have been taken by or under the law of any foreign country for
regulating or controlling the terms or conditions upon which goods or passengers
may be carried by sea . .. [provided] that those measures, insofar as they apply
to things done or to be done outside the territorial jurisdiction of that country by
persons carrying on business in the United Kingdom, constitute an infringement
of the jurisdiction which, under international law, belongs to the United Kingdom.
SCDA, supra note 32, § 1(1)-(2).
See generally Circa, The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Ac-
tions, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 247, 249-52 (1981); Lowe, supra note 20, at 267-72.
For a brief history of the litigation, see In re Ampicillin Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 395, 398-
400 (D.D.C. 1978). The original action was a civil suit filed by the United States Govern-
ment against Bristol-Myers, a British firm, and its United States subsidiary, Beecham
Group, Ltd., alleging violations of the Sherman Act. Id. at 398. Subsequently, private ac-
tions were filed, and all of the suits were consolidated in the District Court for the District
of Columbia for pretrial discovery. Id. For a detailed account of the proceedings in the dis-
trict court and their ramifications, see Lowenfeld, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction and Reasona-
bleness: A Reply to A. V. Lowe, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 629, 631-36 (1981).
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threat of default judgment by the United States court. 7 The Brit-
ish defendant finally negotiated substantial settlement agreements
with the plaintiffs.3 8 Another conflict occurred in 1975, when two
British companies were named as defendants in In re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation" which involved an alleged uranium cartel
consisting of twelve foreign and seventeen domestic uranium pro-
ducing companies. 40 The plaintiff, Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
claimed that price fixing by the cartel had caused a drastic in-
crease in the cost of uranium on the international market and had
rendered many of the Westinghouse delivery contracts commer-
cially impracticable.4I Nine of the foreign defendants, 2 including
the two-British companies," insisted that the court did not have
jurisdiction over them and refused to appear." The United States
37 In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, Misc. 45-70, M.D.L. Docket No. 50 (order May
25, 1973). The British Secretary of State's order to Beecham prohibiting it from producing
documents not within United States territory was published in [Jan.-Mar.] ANTTrrusT &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 595, at A-5 (Jan. 9, 1973). Beecham's response to the default
judgment threat was to petition the British Government for a release from the SCDA
prohibitions. The release was granted. See Lowenfeld, supra note 36, at 634.
" See United States v. Bristol Myers Co., 82 F.R.D. 655 (D.D.C. 1979) (approval of pro-
posed consent decree).
89 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. IlM. 1979).
40 The suit alleged that the 29 members of the Uranium Market Research Organization
had agreed to allocate the non-United States uranium market among themselves, setting
prices, quotas, and contract terms. See Note, supra note 15, at 227-28. This foreign activity
had evidently been provoked by United States restrictions placed upon exports of uranium
produced in the United States and by the requirement that government facilities purchase
only domestic uranium. Id. at 227.
4 The actions against Westinghouse were consolidated in the District Court for the West-
ern District of Virginia. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 405
F. Supp. 316 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975). When Westinghouse requested evidence from a British ura-
nium producing firm, Rio Tinto Zinc Corp., to establish the existence of the cartel, the Brit-
ish firm refused. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R. 434,
434-38 (H.L.). The United States court issued letters of request to the British High Court
asking that the evidence be produced; the British court held that Rio Tinto Zinc did not
have to produce the evidence, and an appeal was taken to the House of Lords. Id. at 435-38.
The House of Lords held that the request asked for evidence outside United States territo-
rial jurisdiction and thus would not bind the defendants. Id. at 438. While the British pro-
ceeding was pending, however, the British firm was named as a defendant in the Westing-
house antitrust action in Illinois. Uranium Antitrust, 473 F. Supp. at 385.
4' Rio Algom Ltd., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp., Ltd., RTZ Services, Ltd., Conzinc Rio Tinto of
Australia, Ltd., Mary Kathleen Uranium, Ltd., Pan-Continental Mining, Ltd., Queensland
Mines, Ltd., Nuclear Fuels Corp., and Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, Ltd.
Uranium Antitrust, 473 F. Supp. at 385.
4' Rio Tinto Zinc Corp., Ltd. and RTZ Services, Ltd. Id.
" The British Government, however, filed a brief amicus curiae in opposition to the
court's extension of jurisdiction to the British defendants. See In re Uranium Antitrust
Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1253-54 (7th Cir. 1980) (appeal by non-defaulting defendants;
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court responded by entering default judgments against all the ab-
sent defendants.4 5 Parliament reacted to these new conflicts by en-
acting the Protection of Trading Interests Act (PTIA).'6
The PTIA was intended to go further than the SCDA by block-
ing all foreign regulation which threatens British "trading inter-
ests" rather than merely those foreign regulations which infringe
upon British shipping activities or interfere with commercial docu-
ments based in Britain.'7 Its provisions are aimed at frustrating
foreign regulation and interference by prohibiting certain actions
by British companies and courts which face such foreign restric-
tions.'8 Some provisions are mandatory while others are left to the
discretion of the British Secretary of State.'9 The British Govern-
court discusses the issue of whether extraterritorial jurisdiction was proper in the lower
court).
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's use of the "intended effects" doctrine and
discarded the British Government's proposal that the Timberlane and Mannington Mills
tests, see supra note 17, be used on the ground that in those cases the defendants had
appeared to contest the court's jurisdiction whereas in Uranium Antitrust the defendants
had not. Id. at 1255-56.
"' Uranium Antitrust, 473 F. Supp. at 390.
41 PTIA, supra note 9.
"" The PTIA grants the British Secretary of State the power to issue orders forbidding
compliance with foreign "measures":
If it appears to the Secretary of State a) that measures have been or are pro-
posed to be taken by or under the law of any overseas country for regulating or
controlling international trade; and b) that those measures, in so far as they apply
or would apply to things done or to be done outside the jurisdiction of that coun-
try by persons carrying on business in the United Kingdom, are damaging or
threaten to damage the trading interests of the United Kingdom....
PTIA, supra note 9, § 1(1).
For a general discussion of the PTIA and the events which led to its enactment, see Note,
The Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980-Britain's Latest Weapon in the Fight
Against United States Antitrust Laws, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 341 (1980-81); Blythe, The
Extraterritorial Impact of the Antitrust Laws: Protecting British Trading Interests, 31 AM.
J. CoMP. L. 99 (1983). Compare U.S. Note, supra note 28 (United States criticism of the
PTIA bill while it was pending in Parliament) with U.K. Response, supra note 26 (British
official's response to the United States criticism of the PTIA).
48 Some sections provide for prohibiting compliance by "persons carrying on business in
the United Kingdom." PTIA, supra note 9, §§ 1-3. Other sections are aimed at restricting
the action which the British courts may take regarding foreign "interference." Id. §§ 4-7.
' The determination of which measures affect British trading interests (and thus will not
be obeyed) is left to the discretion of the British Secretary of State. Id. § 1. The Secretary
also has discretion regarding the section 2 determination of which documents and informa-
tion requested by foreign courts and authorities cannot be produced. Id. § 2. On the other
hand, the provision governing whether certain foreign court judgments will not be honored
in the British courts is subject to prescribed guidelines, although the Secretary may indicate
which additional judgments he feels should not be enforced. Id. § 5. The provision in section
6 for recovery of 2/ of a treble damages judgment is automatic and requires no act by the
Secretary. Id. § 6.
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ment has only used sections 1 and 2 against United States exten-
sions of jurisdiction.50 Section 1 gives the British Secretary of State
the power to direct any person in the United Kingdom not to com-
ply with a prohibition or requirement from another country which
the Secretary believes would endanger the trading interests of the
United Kingdom."1 Section 2 gives the Secretary authority to for-
bid the production of documents located in Britain for the purpose
of foreign litigation when he finds that the order to produce those
documents infringes upon British jurisdiction or prejudices British
sovereignty.52
The PTIA had been invoked only twice prior to British Airways,
and neither instance involved an antitrust violation. The first in-
stance concerned an order by the Enforcement Division of the
United States Commodities Futures Trading Commission (Com-
mission) against a coffee trader based in London." The trader,
Alan J. Ridge & Co., Ltd. (Ridge), was being investigated in con-
nection with possible manipulation of futures trading on the New
York Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange." The Secretary issued a
direction under the PTIA on March 3, 1981 instructing the British
" Sections 1 and 2 are the only sections that have been utilized thus far by the British
Government in British Airways. See supra note 10. For a discussion of British resort to the
PTIA prior to British Airways, see infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text. The other
substantive sections of the PTIA are: section 3, which provides for penalties against British
subjects for violating any other provisions of the PTIA; section 4, which prohibits any
United Kingdom court from ordering the production of evidence in response to a foreign
court's request when the request infringes upon British jurisdiction; section 5, which prohib-
its any United Kingdom court from enforcing foreign judgments based on multiple damages;
and section 6, which allows a defendant who is subjected to a multiple damages award to
recoup all but the compensatory damages from the party who received the judgment. PTIA,
supra note 9, §§ 3-6. See generally Note, supra note 47, at 372-76; Lowe, supra note 20, at
276-80; U.K. Response, supra note 26, at 848-50; Note, supra note 21, at 467-75 (extensive
treatment of the implications of the section 6 "claw back" provision).
"1 PTIA, supra note 9, § 1. The Secretary issued the order to Laker under this section.
See supra note 10. The order which the Secretary issued in response to the Siberian pipe-
line conflict was also under this section. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
" PTIA, supra note 9, § 2. This section also allows the Secretary to prohibit the produc-
tion of such documents or information the production of which 1) threatens British security;
2) is for other than civil or criminal trials; or 3) involves information about documents other
than those specifically requested. Id.
3 Alan J. Ridge & Co., No. 80-16 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 22, 1983). The order called for Ridge to
provide information and to open its relevant records for inspection by the Commission re-
garding whether Ridge's cash transactions in coffee futures posed a threat of futures price
manipulation on the contract market. Id. slip op. at 4.
Id. slip op. at 3. The Commission's Market Surveillance Section had become aware that
Ridge was taking delivery of substantial amounts of coffee under a number of large coffee
futures contracts and determined that a more extensive investigation was necessary. Id. slip
op. at 4.
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defendant not to comply with the Commission's request for docu-
ments.50 In an administrative hearing, Ridge was held to have vio-
lated reporting provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act" and
was prohibited from trading on any United States contract market
for one year.5 7 The second invocation of the PTIA occurred after
the United States announced in the summer of 1982 that foreign
companies operating under United States licenses and United
States subsidiaries operating overseas must refrain from any trade
with the Soviet Union involving equipment which could be used in
the Siberian pipeline construction." The Secretary responded by
issuing orders under the PTIA to the British companies involved,
instructing them to comply with the terms of their preexisting con-
tracts although such compliance would violate the United States
restrictions.' No sanctions were imposed on the British compa-
nies, however, and President Reagan lifted the restrictions on No-
vember 3, 1982.60
Id. slip op. at 6. The basis given for the direction was:
that the call requests information and documents about persons and transactions
outside the United States; that 'the documents... are not within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States'; and that such 'requirements are inadmissable
under section 2(3) of the [Trading) Act in that they are made otherwise than for
the purpose of civil or criminal proceedings which have been instituted in the
United States .... '
Id. slip op. at 6, n.11.
7 U.S.C. § 4i. See Alan J. Ridge & Co., No. 80-16, slip op. at 33.
81 Alan J. Ridge & Co., No. 80-16, slip op. at 33. In concluding that the PTIA direction
did not provide Ridge with an adequate defense, Judge Hunt considered three factors. 1)
The order to produce documents was issued on January 16, 1980; the PTIA came into force
on March 20, 1980; and the Secretary's direction was on March 3, 1981. Therefore Ridge
had been in violation of the Commission's order for over a year before the PTIA direction
was issued. Id. slip op. at 25-26. 2) There was no evidence that Ridge made a good faith
attempt before or after the March 3, 1981 direction to comply with the Commission's order
or to obtain a waiver of the direction. Id. slip op. at 26-27. 3) The vital national interest of
the United States in protecting its commerce through futures market regulation outweighed
the British interest in protecting the confidentiality of its citizens' business transactions. Id.
slip op. at 28-30.
Prompted by the Soviet declaration of martial law in Poland, President Reagan intro-
duced trade restrictions to discourage trade with the Soviet Union in equipment that could
be used in the construction of the Siberian pipeline. See President's Statement on Exten-
sion of U.S. Sanctions on the Export of Oil and Gas Equipment to the Soviet Union, 18
WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 820 (June 21, 1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 864 (1982); Amend-
ments of Oil and Gas Controls to the U.S.S.R., 15 C.F.R. §§ 376, 379, 385 (1982), reprinted
in 21 I.L.M. 864 (1982).
" Protection of Trading Interests (U.S. Reexport Control) Order 1982, [1982] STAT. INST.
No. 885, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 851 (1982).
" President's Radio Message to the Nation Concerning East-West Trade Relations and
the Soviet Pipeline Sanctions, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1475 (Nov. 13, 1982). For the
response of the European Community to the United States restrictions, see LEGAL SERVIcE
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The Laker litigation marks the first time that the Secretary has
invoked the PTIA to block a United States antitrust suit. The
British Court of Appeal weighed the Secretary's action against the
injustice of denying Laker its claim against the British defen-
dants.61 The court focused on three factors to determine that this
"critical equation" favored the granting of the injunction against
Laker."2 First, the court noted that it is obligated to follow the will
of the British Government when issues of foreign policy are in-
volved.65 The court reasoned that when the Government takes such
a strong position in an area under the Government's exclusive con-
trol, the best interests of Britain dictate that the Government and
courts speak with a united voice."
Second, the court considered the extent to which British Caledo-
nian and British Airways could depend on an international avia-
tion treaty, the Bermuda Two Treaty, as a defense to Laker's ac-
tion.6 5  The Treaty provides that disputes arising between
international carriers be settled by arbitrators appointed by the In-
ternational Court of Justice and that pricing agreements be ap-
proved by both the Civil Aviation Authority (U.K.) and the Civil
Aviation Board (U.S.) after affected parties have had an opportu-
nity to raise objections.66 The British defendants asserted that
Laker was in breach of the Treaty by bringing a civil action. Al-
though it pointed out that under British law no private rights or
OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMENTS ON THE U.S. REGULATIONS
CONCERNING TRADE WITH THE U.S.S.R. (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 891 (1982) (officials in
the European Community supporting the British concepts of national and territorial juris-
diction, sharply criticizing the United States interference in foreign trade). For a discussion
of the parallels between the Soviet pipeline embargo and the British Airways litigation, see
Oakley, Laker Probe: Who Will Gain?, Sunday Times (London), July 3, 1983, at 20, col. 2.
"1 British Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R. at 399 (C.A.).
" In determining whether the balance of the "critical equation" favored granting the in-
junction, the court considered this question: "In all the circumstances, is it appropriate to
grant the relief sought in order to avoid injustice?" With that foundation the court turned
to an evaluation of the facts in British Airways. Id.
" Id. at 403.
" Id. The court's adherence to the British Government's foreign policy stance was based
on the House of Lords opinion in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978]
1 All E.R. 434, 448, where, as in British Airways, the British Attorney General had inter-
vened to present the Government's position on extraterritorial jurisdiction. See infra notes
79-84 and accompanying text.
" Bermuda Two Treaty, supra note 7. The Bermuda Two Treaty controls international
airline services between the United Kingdom and the United States, providing mechanisms
for pricing arrangements and arbitration of disputes.
Id. arts. 16-17.
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duties arise from a treaty,67 the court felt compelled to act consist-
ently with the British Government's position that the United
States Government was in breach of the Treaty by allowing
Laker's action.68
Third, the court considered how the PTIA orders would affect
the United States proceedings. 69 The court expressly refrained
from basing its judgment on the other two issues because it consid-
ered the direct impact of the PTIA orders to be the decisive factor
in the "critical equation."70 Counsel for Laker claimed that block-
ing production of British documents would unjustly hinder Laker's
pretrial discovery; however, the court focused on the effect of the
blocking on the ability of British Airways and British Caledonian
to present British documents in their own defense.7 1 Laker still
could obtain discovery from the defendants who were unaffected
by the blocking orders; therefore, the court reasoned that to allow
Laker to proceed against the British defendants who were ham-
pered by PTIA restrictions would result in a "total denial of jus-
tice. '72 The court concluded that the injustice of foreclosing all re-
lief to Laker was outweighed by the injustice to British Airways
and British Caledonian arising from their hindered defense and
therefore granted the injunction requested by the defendants. 3
" British Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R. at 401 (C.A.). "[Treaties] are agreements between
states and they can only be honoured or breached by states. If and in so far as they involve
an obligation to ensure that domestic laws conform with the treaty, this is a matter for the,
states concerned." Id. The defendants had asserted in the High Court that Laker was in
breach of the Treaty by bringing its suit, but Justice Parker rejected the argument and
concluded that nothing in the Treaty precluded the application of the United States anti-
trust law to the defendants' activities. Id.
I Id. at 402-03 (C.A.). The British Attorney General indicated that the Government's
position was that the Treaty controlled the dispute and precluded the application of United
States antitrust law to the case; the court assented and suggested that Laker's dispute
should have remained within the mechanisms prescribed by the Treaty. Id.
69 Id. at 409-10. The court focused on the effect of the section 2 direction issued on July
1, 1983 which blocked production by the British defendants of any of their documents
which were based in Britain. See supra note 10.
British Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R. at 410.
11 Id. at 409-10.
72 The court said:
The likelihood is, of course, that both will be seriously affected, but that the
main effect will be upon the appellants, since Laker may be able to obtain discov-
ery from other parties. The evidence so disclosed may point the finger at the ap-
pellants, who will be prevented from explaining their conduct.
Id. at 410.
11 Id. In granting the injunction the court also denied Laker's application for judicial re-
view of the Government's PTIA orders. Id. at 407. Laker's arguments were: 1) that "mea-
sures" in section 1 of the PTIA could refer only to actions under the antitrust statutes and
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Use of a "critical equation" to determine which course would re-
sult in the least injustice to all parties was an adaptation of a test
developed by the House of Lords in Castanho v. Brown & Root
(U.K.), Ltd. 4 In Castanho the court used a "critical equation" to
weigh the advantage to the plaintiff against the disadvantage to
the defendant in allowing the plaintiff to continue an action in a
foreign court.7 5 Although the balancing process was similar to that
employed in British Airways, the Castanho case differed signifi-
cantly in terms of the availability of an alternative forum for re-
lief.L76 In Castanho, the plaintiff had brought a concurrent suit in
England and could therefore receive at least some relief in the
British court. There was no alternative forum, however, for Laker's
claim against the British defendants because they had not violated
any British laws.7  Due to the absence of an alternative forum, the
use of the "critical equation" in British Airways may be viewed as
exceeding the originally intended purpose of that test.7 1
Although the application of the "critical equation" to the facts
in British Airways may have been unprecedented, there was strong
precedent for consideration of the policy statements made by the
not the statutes themselves; 2) that the Sherman and Clayton Acts were not "restrictive or
regulatory of international trade" but were designed to free trade from restrictions; and 3)
that the scope of the PTIA orders exceeded the sections under which they were issued and
were so general that they insufficiently indicated what activity was prohibited. The court
responded: 1) that the term "measures" was generic in nature and included foreign statu-
tory provisions; 2) that the antitrust statutes did seek to regulate trade conducted on a
cooperative level designed to minimize competition; and 3) that any order that was not all-
embracing would necessarily be vague, but that such vagueness would not invalidate it. Id.
at 405-07.
' 1981 A.C. 557 (H.L.).
" Castanho was based on a claim filed against a British defendant in a Texas court for
personal injury suffered by the plaintiff while in Britain. The House of Lords acknowledged
that an injunction could issue against the plaintiff's action in Texas because the plaintiff's
filing of a related claim in Britain had brought him under the British court's jurisdiction. Id.
at 573-74. However, the Lords refused to enjoin the suit in Texas even though the British
court offered an alternative forum. Id. at 575-77. The Lords found that the balance of the
"critical equation," weighing the advantage to the plaintiff against the disadvantage to the
defendant, required that the plaintiff be allowed to proceed in the United States court. Id.
at 576-77.
= British Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R. at 399 (C.A.).
Id. at 398.
Laker's counsel argued that the lack of an alternative forum for Laker's claim funda-
mentally distinguished this case from Castanho and that without such an alternative forum
the injunction should never be granted. Id. at 399. The court responded that the exercise of
the injunctive power should be flexible enough to avoid injustice in each case and that here
the question was how to minimize the injustice to both parties. Id.
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British Attorney General. 79 In Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westing-
house Electric Corp.,80 a British case arising from the uranium
contracts litigation, the House of Lords had determined that in
matters of foreign policy the courts and the Government should
speak as one.8 The British Airways court applied this unitary doc-
trine to intervening statements made by the British Attorney Gen-
eral and concluded that a party is justified in refusing a request for
documents outside the territory of the court making the request."2
Furthermore, the court depended upon the Rio Tinto Zinc doc-
trine to argue that Laker should have accepted the fact that the
British Government considered the United States to be in breach
of the Bermuda Two Treaty by allowing Laker's action. 83 Although
the court conceded that it could not interpret a treaty, 4 its adher-
ence to the Government's position on the Treaty was a
precedented alternative to judicial interpretation.
Ultimately, however, policy arguments were not the deciding fac-
tor in the "critical equation"; the impact of the PTIA orders on
document production in the United States court was determina-
tive." The court, dispensing with the policy arguments, held that
the injustice to the British defendants overwhelmingly tipped the
balance in favor of the injunction.88 Therefore, the primary test in
'9 The House of Lords in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. held that the
policy statements of the British Government should control in a case involving matters of
foreign affairs. [1978] 1 All E.R. 434, 448 (H.L.). See supra note 41.
- (19781 1 All E.R. 434 (H.L.).
81 Lord Wilberforce wrote:
[I]n a matter affecting the sovereignty of the United Kingdom the courts are
entitled to take account of the declared policy of Her Majesty's Government ....
[T]he policy of Her Majesty's Government has been against recognition of United
States investigatory jurisdiction extraterritorially against United Kingdom compa-
nies. The courts should in such matters speak with the same voice as the
executive.
Id. at 448.
82 British Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R. at 403-04 (C.A.).
" Id. at 409. The court also suggested that Laker should not be allowed to enjoy the
protection of the British Government as a British national while acting contrary to the ex-
pressed will of that Government in pursuing this action outside the Bermuda Two Treaty
mechanisms. Id.
" Id. at 402.
Id. at 409-10. See supra note 72.
The court concluded:
Whatever weight may or may not be given to the other factors in the critical
equation, in our judgment the effect of the order and directions is decisive. They
have rendered the issues raised by Laker in the district court action wholly untri-
able as between Laker and the plaintiffs [British Airways and British Caledonian].
British Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R. at 410.
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determining whether a plaintiff should be enjoined in a foreign
court was a question of which is a greater injustice: denying all
relief to the plaintiff or allowing a case to go to trial when the de-
fendants' "hands are tied." The use of the equation under such
circumstances was unprecedented; thus, the determination was
within the discretion of the court."
The reason that the court applied the "critical equation" to a
situation other than that for which it was originally intended can
be better understood by viewing British Airways in the context of
the other battles between British and United States courts over
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Because Laker was a British corpora-
tion and therefore subject to the British court's jurisdiction, the
court could enjoin Laker from pursuing the case.s" By issuing the
injunction, the court was apparently trying to avoid the pitfalls
that had been encountered in earlier conflicts. In the ampicillin lit-
igation8 9 the United States court responded to the SCDA orders by
threatening the British defendant with adverse findings of fact;
thus it was clear that some United States courts would not recog-
nize a foreign government's "blocking" production of evidence as a
valid defense.90 Although the British Government had taken no
formal action in the Uranium Antitrust case,'" they had filed
briefs amici curiae in opposition to United States extension of ju-
risdiction to the international cartel members." The Uranium An-
titrust court rejected the defendants' arguments and entered de-
fault judgments against them.98 Faced with the United States
Id. at 398-99.
" The United States district court acknowledged that it had the power to enjoin a plain-
tiff in a foreign court but insisted that this power could only be exercised in "unusual, very
narrow circumstances." Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124,
1129-30 (D.D.C. 1983).
9See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
"The court, instead of considering the impact of the SCDA orders, acted strictly accord-
ing to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by threatening the party disobeying the discov-
ery order with adverse findings of fact. See FD. R. Cirv. P. 37(b)(2)(A). See also supra note
37 and accompanying text. It should be noted that Laker's action is currently pending in
this same district court. See supra note 2.
"1 Uranium Antitrust, 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1979). The British Government did
take formal action in the related British case, Rio Tinto Zinc, by intervening in opposition
to the United States court's extraterritorial extension of jurisdiction. In Uranium Antitrust,
the Illinois civil antitrust suit, the British defendants never appeared in court. See In re
Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1255-56 (7th Cir. 1980).
" See Uranium Antitrust, 617 F.2d at 1253-56. The United Kingdom brief supported the
consideration of the Timberlane and Mannington Mills factors in determining whether ju-
risdiction was "reasonable." Id. at 1254-55.
I Uranium Antitrust, 473 F. Supp. at 390. See also Uranium Antitrust, 617 F.2d at
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courts' proclivity for default judgments in these cases and the re-
sulting threat to British Airways' and British Caledonian's assets
in the United States, the British Airways court took advantage of
Laker's British citizenship to strengthen the British defendants'
position in the United States proceedings. 4
The strong British opposition to United States extraterritorial
enforcement of antitrust law which is embodied in British Airways
and the PTIA juxtaposed with the insistence in the United States
to apply that law uniformly brings the United States-British con-
flict to a critical stage.95 The effect of this bilateral intransigence
on international commerce, law, and politics could be substantial.
Commercially, the conflict could discourage trade between the two
countries for fear of an unpredictable application of United States
law to activity outside its territory.96 The PTIA and British Air-
ways could diminish severely judicial comity between the two na-
tions.97 Although the British Airways court denied any enmity
against the United States court, its conclusion that the British de-
fendants could not receive a fair trial in the United States was far
from a gesture of judicial comity." Furthermore, the fundamental
1257-58.
" The British Secretary of State speculated that the United States court might seize the
assets of the British airlines as security for the payment of any judgment that might be
rendered against them. See Sunday Times (London), June 19, 1983, at 24, col. 1. Prime
targets of such a seizure include airplanes and any terminals at United States airports
owned by the British airlines. See id.
" See UK-US Hold New Talks on Laker Dispute, 44 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 116, at 1056 (May 26, 1983) (talks between the two governments concerning
Laker have involved United States Department of State and British Department of Trade
and Foreign Office officials). The confrontational character of the British Airways dispute
since the PTIA orders were issued and since the Court of Appeal issued the injunction re-
flects the continued escalation of this conflict. Cf. Note, supra note 15, at 272-75 (suggesting
that the retaliatory nature of the blocking statutes and related court battles is reaching a
crucial stage).
" See Note, supra note 15, at 274. The litigation surrounding Laker's demise exemplifies
the uncertainty which foreign companies sometimes face when they conduct business in the
United States. British Airways and British Caledonian were engaged in legal business activi-
ties according to British standards and could reasonably have expected to be protected by
the Bermuda Two Treaty from interference. Nevertheless, they were drawn into the United
States court because of their contact with United States commerce. British Airways, (1983]
3 All E.R. at 401-03 (C.A.).
"While the British Court of Appeal case was pending, the judge in the United States
district court wrote that he considered the possible injunction to be a dangerous precedent
and one which dealt with "delicate questions of comity." Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am.
Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124, 1130 (D.D.C. 1983).
" British Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R at 397 (C.A.). The court's conclusion could be viewed
as an attack on the fundamental fairness that a foreign defendant receives in a United
States trial. See id. at 410.
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concern expressed in British Airways of whether extraterritorial
jurisdiction is appropriate suggests that, absent considerations of
comity by both British and United States courts, the conflict may
escalate. 99 Politically, the persistent disagreement between officials
of the two governments suggests that this conflict may not be
finally solved until bilateral negotiations are held on procedure and
policy.100 Although the United States recently signed an agreement
with Australia to resolve similar jurisdictional and policy issues,101
there are no indications that such a solution is being sought with
Great Britain.102
The outcome of the Laker litigation may not become evident for
some time; 03 however, the case has already become an important
"The intervening comments of the British Attorney General in British Airways, as in
Uranium Antitrust, called for a clearer consideration of foreign laws by United States
courts when considering whether to extend jurisdiction extraterritorially. Id. at 403-04. The
British Government continued to hold that the commercial laws of one nation should not be
enforced internationally without a consideration of other nations' commercial practices, es-
pecially in the areas of international aviation and shipping. Id.
100 British officials have expressed repeatedly their desire to negotiate agreements aimed
at settling this transatlantic conflict. See British Minister Criticizes Exercise of Extraterri-
torial Jurisdiction by U.S., 43 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1088, at 861-62
(Nov. 4, 1982). See also Diplomatic Note No. 196, supra note 22.
United States officials have indicated that they believe that when a jurisdictional conflict
is grounded in a policy dispute, the best solution may be to harmonize policies through
diplomacy. Address by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam before the American Soci-
ety of International Law (Apr. 15, 1983), reprinted in 83 DEP'T ST. BuLL. No. 2075, at 48
(June 1983). Several scholars have suggested that bilateral agreements could offer a viable
solution. See Comment, supra note 19, at 967-70; Note, supra note 15, at 273-75; Note,
supra note 21, at 477-79. Other proferred solutions include international reconsideration of
the theories of jurisdiction toward reaching agreement on the proper role of sovereignty in
international trade (see Lowe, supra note 20, at 281-82) and adoption by the United States
courts and government of a "rule of reason" which would dictate that foreign interests be
balanced with the need to protect the domestic economy before jurisdiction is extended
extraterritorially (see Lowenfeld, supra note 36, at 638).
0, Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, United
States-Australia, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 10,365, reprinted in 43 ANTrrRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1071, at 36-37 (July 1, 1982) and 21 I.L.M. 702 (1982). See Note, A
Comparative Analysis of the Efficacy of Bilateral Agreements in Resolving Disputes Be-
tween Sovereigns Arising from Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Law: The Austra-
lian Agreement, 13 GA. J. INT'L & CoMr. L. 49 (1983); Note, The United States-Australian
Cooperation Agreement: A Step in the Right Direction, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 127 (1983).
101 Rather than negotiating agreements, United States officials generally have chosen to
maintain their aggressive antitrust policies but to soften somewhat the application of these
policies by considering those factors that make foreign commerce unique. See Shenefield,
The Perspective of the U.S. Department of Justice, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITO-
RIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS 24 (J. Griffim ed. 1979).
10 Petition for review of the Court of Appeal's decision has been granted by the House of
Lords. Amicus Curiae Appointed to Advise District Court in Laker Litigation, 45 ANn-
TRUST & TRADE REG. RaP. (BNA) No. 1142, at 902 (Dec. 1, 1983).
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part of the expanding collection of United States-British extrater-
ritorial jurisdictional conflicts. The British Airways case provides
an example of the British Government's using the PTIA to protect
British companies from what it perceives as overreaching by the
United States.1" The United States, undaunted by British reac-
tions, persists in attempting to assure that unrestricted foreign cor-
porations do not take advantage of their domestic counterparts
which remain restrained by United States antitrust law.105 The
Laker litigation demonstrates that unilateral action and reaction
have resulted in little more than an escalation of the conflict.'"e
The disruption of international relations by the PTIA on one side
of the Atlantic and the "effects doctrine" on the other suggests
that some compromise on extraterritorial jurisdiction should be
pursued by both the United States and Great Britain.10 7
Ward S. Bondurant
104 See Oakley, supra note 60.
" See id. See also Laker Antitrust Suit Against Major Airlines Will be Tried in U.S.
Court, 44 AwrrmusT & TRADz Rzo. Rep. (BNA) No. 1114, at 982-83 (May 12, 1983);
Shenefield, supra note 102, at 24.
106 Upon passage of the PTIA the British Government asserted that it had not abandoned
the cooperative approach to settlement of antitrust disputes with the United States by the
enactment of the PTIA. See U.K. Response, supra note 26, at 847-48. The PTIA's blocking
of a United States court's extension of jurisdiction, however, can be viewed as an attempt to
frustrate one unilateral action by retaliating with another unilateral action. See Lowenfeld,
supra note 36, at 636-37.
o Since this writing, the House of Lords has reversed the Court of Appeal, denying the
injunction against Laker. See British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R.
413 (H.L.). The Lords reasoned that, absent a showing of unconscionable conduct on the
part of Laker, there would be no justification for effectively foreclosing Laker's antitrust
claim through the injunction, and that the terms of the Bermuda Two Treaty subjected all
of these transatlantic carriers to the private law of both countries. Id. at 414.
This judgment, however, does not resolve the multitude of issues regarding extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction which remain before the United States court, issues which, until they are
resolved, will continue to threaten orderly commercial relations between the United States
and Britain.
